The video reviews Starship Flight 12 (Ship 39), which suffered the loss of one Raptor vacuum engine and visible fuel leakage during ascent. Despite this, the remaining engines burned longer to keep the vehicle on its planned sub‑orbital trajectory, and the ship adjusted its re‑entry angle‑of‑attack to generate extra lift—essentially “skipping” off the upper atmosphere—to compensate for the reduced performance. These adaptations allowed Ship 39 to splash down close to its target zone in the Indian Ocean.
However, the landing sequence was unstable. Near touchdown the vehicle switched from two engines to a single engine, eliminating differential thrust for roll control and creating an off‑center thrust vector. Combined with residual angular momentum from an earlier roll maneuver and a higher center of mass caused by extra propellant left in the header tanks, the ship exhibited pronounced pitching, rolling and a dramatic pirouette‑like motion just before impact. Analysts note that these control‑margin issues, rooted in the engine loss and resulting flight‑profile changes, make a high‑confidence tower catch (Mechazilla) premature.
While Flight 12 demonstrated remarkable resilience—surviving major propulsion faults, dynamically reshaping its re‑entry path, and still meeting core objectives—experts such as Joe TechMier argue that significant refinements are needed before attempting a ship catch. They expect the earliest realistic catch attempt to be on Flight 15 or 16, not Flight 13, and stress that repeatability and stability must be proven first. The video concludes by asking viewers whether SpaceX should try a catch on the next flight or continue testing.
1. Flight 12 used Ship 39, which completed a flip maneuver, landing burn, and a pirouette‑like motion before splashdown.
2. During ascent, Ship 39 lost one of its three Raptor vacuum engines and fuel leakage was visible.
3. The remaining two engines extended their burn duration to compensate for the lost thrust, keeping the vehicle on its planned suborbital trajectory.
4. The engine loss altered Ship 39’s trajectory, requiring a modified re‑entry profile.
5. To compensate for a lower perigee, Ship 39 reduced its angle of attack and used aerodynamic lift to stretch its glide phase at roughly 68–70 km altitude.
6. Ship 39 performed the landing flip and landing burn using its two remaining sea‑level Raptor engines.
7. Close‑up footage showed the landing sequence was unstable, with marginal attitude control before splashdown.
8. Just before splashdown, Ship 39 pitched and rolled aggressively, including a pirouette‑like motion near the surface.
9. Ryan Kaitton (NASA Space Flights) described the final 270‑degree roll as “super sketchy,” noting the vehicle tipped about 15° off vertical.
10. Joe TechMier characterized the landing burn as wildly and marginally controlled, with a non‑stabilized, not quite vertical attitude at touchdown.
11. Ship 39 transitioned from two engines to a single engine near landing, which reduced control margins and eliminated direct roll control.
12. A roll maneuver was initiated while still on two engines, but one engine shut down before the rotation could be fully canceled, leaving residual angular momentum.
13. After the transition to a single engine, the remaining thrust lacked sufficient authority to counter the ongoing rotation, causing oscillation.
14. The ascent engine loss forced the remaining engines to burn longer, altering the trajectory and flight profile and possibly introducing leaks.
15. SpaceX skipped the planned re‑entry burn demonstration and an important maneuver for future orbital missions, leaving more propellant in the header tanks than expected.
16. Extra propellant shifted Ship 39’s center of mass upward, reducing stability during the belly‑flop‑to‑vertical transition.
17. Despite off‑nominal conditions, Ship 39 landed remarkably close to its intended splashdown zone in the Indian Ocean.
18. Ship 39 recovered its trajectory by flattening its attitude to reduce angle of attack, generating aerodynamic lift and briefly “skipping” along the atmosphere at 68–70 km altitude.
19. This atmospheric skipping extended the glide distance, giving the guidance system more time to correct the trajectory caused by the earlier engine failure.
20. Based on Flight 12 data, Joe TechMier expects Flight 13 to follow a similar suborbital profile with an ocean splashdown rather than a tower catch.
21. He views the earliest realistic window for a ship‑catch attempt as Flight 15 or 16.
22. A Starship catch differs from a SuperHeavy catch because the ship is far larger, returns through a less stable aerodynamic regime, and any oscillation near the tower could cause a catastrophic collision.
23. Flight 12 was not classified as a failure; it demonstrated survival of major propulsion issues, dynamic re‑entry reshaping, and completion of core flight objectives under difficult conditions.
24. The vehicle showed resilience and adaptability early in its development program.
25. SpaceX now possesses a large amount of real‑world flight data from Flight 12 that can be used to inform future flights.